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1. Introduction 40 
 Individuals have the right to expect the food that they eat is safe and suitable for consumption 41 
(Codex Alimentarius Commission CAC/RCP, 1969:3). Food safety is the concept that “food will not cause 42 
harm to the consumer when it is prepared and/or eaten according to its intended use” (BS EN ISO 22000 43 
2005; Codex, 2003, British Retail Consortium BRC, 2015:112). An organization will develop a formal food 44 
safety management system (FSMS) to ensure that food is safe for consumption and also to mitigate 45 
foodborne illness, food poisoning or wider considerations of contamination that can cause harm and injury. 46 
Therefore, FSMS must be developed, validated and then appropriately applied to ensure their efficacy at 47 
all steps in the food supply chain from origin in primary production through to the final consumer. Global 48 
distribution of food between multiple supply chain sectors relies upon a consistent understanding by all 49 
those concerned as to what food safety is and how it is effectively managed to prevent harm.  A universal 50 
approach to address food safety hazard identification and assessment, and then FSMS development, 51 
validation, implementation, monitoring and verification is the use of the hazard assessment tool Hazard 52 
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) based on Codex Alimentarius Principles (Codex, 2009).  Indeed, 53 
within the European Union (EU) the use of a HACCP-based FSMS is mandatory post-harvest and post 54 
slaughter within the food supply chain (EU 852/2004). Moreover, in the last few decades, various consortia 55 
of stakeholders have introduced multiple private standards in order to guide/direct the design, 56 
implementation, and verification of FSMS. These include the British Retail Consortium (BRC) standard, BS 57 
EN ISO22000, Safe Quality Food (SQF), and International Featured Standards (IFS-Food). However, an 58 
organizational FSMS is not situated in isolation. People design, implement, monitor and verify the efficacy 59 
of a FSMS so their personal interaction with the transactional (technical) elements of both the formal system 60 
and other informal practices will impact on the ability of an organization to grow, process, distribute and/or 61 
sell safe and wholesome food.  62 
  63 
 Food safety culture (FS-Culture) is the overarching organizational framework associated with food 64 
safety formed by the interplay of actors within the organization (De Boeck, Jacxsens, Bollaerts, & Vlerick, 65 
2015). FS-Culture develops through the interlinking of three theoretical perspectives: organizational culture, 66 
food science and social cognitive science (Jespersen, Griffiths, Maclaurin, Chapman & Wallace 2016). An 67 
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An understanding how a FSMS is developed and implemented, is also influenced by internal and external 68 
pressures and then interacts with the FS-Culture is critical to consistent achievement of food safety 69 
requirements. In order to identify the direction and strategy of future empirical research, this narrative review 70 
contextualizes the historical development of the theory associated with the development and adoption of 71 
FSMS. The review then considers the evolution of a wider academic and industry understanding of the 72 
influence of FS-Culture and how such culture frames and enables, or conversely restricts, the efficacy of 73 
the FSMS. The systematic approaches to managing food safety using HACCP as a food safety hazard 74 
assessment tool and the evolution of private safety and quality assurance standards are critiqued, with 75 
particular emphasis on the underlying drive for benchmarking and isomorphism (i.e. reducing differentiation 76 
to create increased uniformity in private standard requirements). Further, the food safety challenges in 77 
modern food supply systems are explored and the potential requirement for a holistic approach to food 78 
safety management and performance is examined. The review is then drawn together to identify potential 79 
research gaps worthy of further study and provide direction for application in the food industry. 80 
2. Evolving definitions and the meaning of food safety 81 
A food hazard is defined in classic food safety vocabulary as “a biological, chemical, or physical agent in, 82 
or condition of, food with the potential to cause an adverse health effect.” (CAC, 2003:5; BS EN ISO 22000; 83 
2005; Wallace, Sperber & Mortimore, 2011:65; Manning, 2017a). The Campden BRI Guide G42 (Gaze, 84 
2009; 2015) expands on this tri-categorization to include food allergens as a fourth category. Mortimore 85 
and Wallace (1994; 1998; 2013) use the CAC (2003) categories, and include allergens within the category 86 
of a chemical hazard (Luning & Marcelis, 2009; Manning, 2017a). Further to the above definitions, BRC 87 
(2015:112) has an evolved definition for a hazard as being an agent of any type with the potential to cause 88 
harm (usually, biological, chemical, physical or radiological), thus no longer differentiating allergens as a 89 
separate category but including the new category of radiological hazards which is gaining wider industry 90 
attention. Although Aladjadjiyan (2006) defines radiological agents as physical hazards, there is limited 91 
guidance on how this group of hazards should be characterized. The Food and Agriculture Organization’s 92 
Assuring Food Safety and Quality: Guidelines for Strengthening National Food Control Systems publication 93 
(FAO, 2003:3) in their definition of food safety differentiate between chronic and acute food safety hazards 94 
stating that: “food safety refers to all those hazards, whether chronic or acute, that may make food injurious 95 
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to the health of the consumer.” Further, food safety has also been described as ‘limiting the presence of 96 
those hazards, whether chronic or acute, that may make food injurious to the health of the consumer’ (WHO, 97 
2015). Thus, whilst contemporary thinking about food safety still revolves around the control of hazards in 98 
food, the concept of acute and chronic illness that is related to those hazards is important. The term “acute” 99 
suggests sudden or short term onset (Sprenger, 2014). Chronic hazards are those hazards that have 100 
medium to long-term onset, examples being carcinogens, mutagens and teratogenic and 101 
immunosuppressive agents (FAO, 1994) or sequelae of acute foodborne illness, e.g. irritable bowel 102 
syndrome or Guillain Barre syndrome associated with Campylobacter infection (Ternhag, Törner, 103 
Svensson, Ekdahl, & Giesecke, 2008; Kirkpatrick & Tribble, 2011). Therefore, depending on the toxic agent 104 
of concern, the term food poisoning is considered as being either acute or chronic in terms of onset period 105 
and duration of illness (Manning, 2017a). Commonly, the term food poisoning focuses on notions of toxicity 106 
specifically i.e. the agent that causes food poisoning being a toxin of either a microbiological origin or other 107 
source, whereas foodborne disease or foodborne illness are broader terms relating to infection and/or 108 
toxicity. Manning (2017a) suggests that chronic non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as heart 109 
disease, type 2 diabetes, obesity, cancers and illnesses associated with accumulative toxicity could be 110 
revisited within organizational hazard assessment.  Thus, based on Manning’s (2017a) definition, illness, 111 
poisoning or intoxication associated with food can be redefined as being:  112 
“a health disorder with symptoms of either of short [acute] or long [chronic] term duration with a specific 113 
onset period that is induced by consuming food that is contaminated by biological organisms or agents 114 
that have the ability to invade host cells and/or produce toxins once ingested, or food that contains toxic 115 
material at the time of consumption, or by consuming an unbalanced diet over a prolonged period of time, 116 
leading to over and under nutrition.” 117 
   Moreover, historical and current thinking limits the scope of FSMS to the control and management 118 
of the aforementioned food hazards and does not included the wider consideration of prevention of NCDs. 119 
Although it can be argued that NCDs may involve ‘conditions of food with the potential to cause an adverse 120 
health effect’. Indeed, the advent of personalized medicine and personalized healthcare especially around 121 
food allergy (Ferrando et al. 2017) means that organizations need to consider how these developments will 122 
influence the categorization of food hazards and intoxication in the future (Manning & Soon, 2017) and the 123 
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impact on management approaches to food hazard control and management. The evolution of HACCP-124 
based FSMS for control of food hazards is now considered.    125 
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3.  Systematic approaches to food safety management using HACCP 126 
3.1 Evolution of HACCP-based FSMS 127 
 The adoption of HACCP as a means to develop FSMS evolved from the 1950s and the early days 128 
of the United States (US) manned space program (Ross-Nazzal, 2007) (Figure 1). The HACCP approach 129 
resulted from a need to identify a preventative assurance approach that could give a high degree of 130 
confidence in the food safety program employed rather than a reactive, control-based end-product testing 131 
approach. Despite having proved its utility in developing the processes for food production for the US space 132 
program nearly sixty years ago, take-up of the HACCP innovation by the food industry was slow. Although 133 
the philosophy of analyzing food safety hazards and identifying critical control points (CCPs) came out of 134 
this initial National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) work, there was no clearly defined 135 
requirement for teams to apply the principles employed. Indeed the term HACCP itself had not been 136 
determined initially. Instead, the term was used later by the Pillsbury Company (La Chance, 2006; Wallace, 137 
Holyoak, Powell, & Dykes, 2012). HACCP was not shared publicly in the food industry until 1971 when the 138 
Pillsbury Company (part of the NASA space foods program team) presented the initial concept at the 139 
Conference on Food Protection (Bauman, 1974; 1990; 1993; Mayes, 1992; Wallace et al. 2012).  Further, 140 
the technical approach of HACCP has evolved in terms of how to do it; when to do it; what products and 141 
processes to cover; what food safety controls to implement at the process level; and lastly which food safety 142 
hazards to manage at CCPs, as opposed to those hazards would be more effectively managed through 143 
prerequisite programs such as good manufacturing practice (GMP) and good hygienic practice (GHP). 144 
Take in Figure 1 145 
 146 
 Early HACCP had three principles equating to principles 1, 2 and 4 of the current seven principles 147 
Codex Alimentarius Commission approach (CAC/RCP, 1969; rev. 4, 2003). Initially, the use of HACCP 148 
focused on microbiological hazards, although the physical condition of food was considered in the space 149 
program as a potential hazard to instrumentation failure (Ross-Nazzal, 2007; Wallace et al. 2011, Wallace, 150 
Sperber & Mortimore, 2018). The Pillsbury Company expanded the use of HACCP more generally 151 
throughout the 1970s in their consumer food manufacturing processes. The spread of HACCP more widely 152 
within the food industry was promoted initially in the US by Pillsbury’s training of Food and Drug 153 
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Administration (FDA) canned foods inspectors in 1972 followed by the publication of the US canned foods 154 
regulations in 1973 (Wallace et al. 2011, 2018).  International diffusion of the HACCP approach by US 155 
bodies was promoted firstly by a focus in the microbiological area through the US National Research 156 
Report, An evaluation of the role of microbiological criteria for foods and food ingredients (NRC, 1985). 157 
Subsequently, 1988 saw the formation of the US National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria 158 
for Foods (NACMCF) (Wallace et al. 2011, 2018), a body which remains important in international HACCP 159 
to this day. The similarly named but independent international body, the International Commission on 160 
Microbiological Specifications for Foods (ICMSF), which was established in 1962, also took on the HACCP 161 
mantle and in 1988, published the first complete book devoted solely to HACCP (ICMSF, 1988; Wallace et 162 
al. 2011). A third group, that began working around the same time, was the Codex Alimentarius 163 
Commission’s Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH).  The CCFH and NACMCF groups both started working 164 
on documents to define the HACCP system and provided guidelines on its application, resulting in the first 165 
definitive HACCP reports: NACMCF in 1992 and CCFH, generally known as Codex, in 1993 (Wallace et al. 166 
2011, 2018). There were a number of similarities between the two reports (NACMCF, 1992; Codex, 1993), 167 
largely due to overlap between membership of the committees and the US serving as permanent chair of 168 
CCFH (Wallace et al. 2011, 2018).   169 
 The adoption of the HACCP principles by the food industry as a common approach for managing 170 
food safety follows the diffusion of innovation (DoI) theory (Rogers, 2003).   Diffusion is ‘the process by 171 
which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 172 
system’ (Rogers, 2003:11). The DoI theory explains the narrative of innovators, early adopters, majority 173 
players and laggards. Existing regulatory bodies and industry food safety communication channels spread 174 
the message about HACCP as an innovation in food safety hazard assessment and control, convincing 175 
more people, companies and/or organizations to become adopters. A number of factors affect the rate of 176 
diffusion of any innovation, including social structures and system norms, the presence and reaction of 177 
opinion leaders, and the perceived consequences of the innovation (Rogers, 2003). With regard to the 178 
HACCP approach specifically, the perceived consequences of safer food and protection of public health 179 
remain the principal reasons for adoption.  180 
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 Following the initial communication from Pillsbury to the wider US food industry  (Bauman, 1993), 181 
the flow of HACCP throughout the world was influenced by opinion leaders; initially Howard Bauman himself 182 
and then groups of scientific experts who recognized the theoretical benefits of HACCP and/or were 183 
involved in early adopter companies. This ‘invisible college of HACCP experts’ (Demortain, 2007, p9) acted 184 
as change agents (Rogers, 2003), influencing the innovation adoption decisions of others via the national 185 
(e.g. US NACMCF) and international (e.g. Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius) food safety committees 186 
and conference platforms (e.g. the five Food Safety and HACCP Forums held between 1997 and 2002 in 187 
Noordwijk, the Netherlands). These developments led to the publication and adoption of HACCP Principles 188 
and guidelines (NACMCF, 1992, 1997; Codex, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2009). Positive views about HACCP and 189 
its preventative advantages led to its adoption by many large food companies around the world. This led to 190 
further diffusion of innovation to other and smaller companies, driven by continued communication and the 191 
development of mandatory legislative frameworks (e.g. Regulation EC No. 852/2004) and private standards 192 
(Kotsanopoulos & Arvanitoyannis, 2017). In addition, the global reach of HACCP, as the chosen approach 193 
for developing a FSMS, was facilitated greatly by the status of Codex as an organization i.e. that it is jointly 194 
chaired by the UN FAO and the World Health Organization (WHO). This means that between UN trading 195 
partners, who are signatories to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Codex reports have the equivalence 196 
of legal frameworks (Wallace et al. 2011, 2018). 197 
 From these early beginnings, HACCP was gradually accepted around the world, first in 198 
manufacturing but later the approach was extended into catering, retail, food packaging and other 199 
applications (Figure 1). Thus the seven Codex HACCP principles have become the cornerstone of the 200 
systematic design of FSMS in all sectors. However, whilst perceptions of the benefits of the use of HACCP 201 
principles are now universal, how HACCP is applied varies in practice. Initially, development of HACCP 202 
based FSMS focused on product specific ‘HACCP studies’ (Mortimore & Wallace, 2013). Over time, a more 203 
generic approach was used where products considered intrinsically to be highly similar to each other, and 204 
as a result deemed to have the same inherent food safety hazards, were grouped e.g. meat or seafood 205 
products. This product-led approach to HACCP, whether single products or generic groups of products, 206 
was then joined by a process-led HACCP approach whereby the hazard assessment is undertaken based 207 
on the specific process or processes that are employed in the manufacturing situation (Mortimore and 208 
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Wallace, 1998). The process-led approach considers food safety hazards associated with the ingredients 209 
and the role of the process step itself in delivering food safety. The process-led approach assesses how 210 
food safety hazards are managed effectively by process CCPs e.g. cooking, pasteurization, metal detection 211 
etc.  In complex processing operations, typically most manufacturing situations, individual products are 212 
made via a combination of processes, e.g. a prepared meal may consist of components that undergo 213 
different initial processes, sometimes in different manufacturing locations, and that are then combined 214 
before undergoing further processes. This means that the process-led “modular” approach is applied either 215 
to individual processes or alternatively to sets of processes that make up the overall product portfolio of an 216 
operation (Mortimore & Wallace, 1998, 2013).  217 
 The challenge of trying to manage large numbers of individual HACCP plans and the associated 218 
management records, meant the application of HACCP through the modular process-led approach started 219 
to take root in the 1990s (Mortimore & Wallace, 1994; 1998; 2013; 2015; Wallace, 2006; Williams, 2010). 220 
The operational challenge outlined here was also a road-block to the early application of HACCP in catering 221 
businesses where early adopters wrestled with developing HACCP plans for every single menu item and 222 
found that the system was unmanageable and unsustainable. Multiple authors have considered the barriers 223 
to the adoption of HACCP especially for small businesses (Vela & Fernández, 2003; Baş, Yüksel & 224 
Çavuşoğlu, 2007; Taylor, 2008). These barriers include technical barriers and a lack of pre-requisites and 225 
operational plans (Panisello & Quantick, 2001; Galstyan & Harutyunyan, 2016); a lack of knowledge and 226 
skills (Galstyan & Harutyunyan, 2016); a lack of motivation (Toropilová & Bystrický, 2015); concern over 227 
the depth of change required to implement HACCP (Herath & Henson, 2010); associated perceptions of 228 
bureaucracy (Taylor & Taylor, 2004; Lowe & Taylor, 2013); and concern over the associated costs, 229 
investment requirements and financial impact (Panisello & Quantick, 2001;  Nguyen, Wilcock & Aung, 2004; 230 
Herath & Henson, 2010; Galstyan & Harutyunyan, 2016). However, a key driver to adopt HACCP is that it 231 
is a retailer pre-requisite for market access to the food supply chain (Mortimore & Wallace, 1994, 1998, 232 
2013; Herath & Henson, 2010; Lowe, & Taylor, 2013). 233 
 The commonly held belief amongst many organizations that the product-led approach was the only 234 
“way to do HACCP”, i.e. the requirement for multiple specific HACCP plans for all individual recipes and 235 
products, was a barrier that certainly did not help promulgate the system beyond the manufacturing stage 236 
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of the food supply chain. This barrier was gradually overcome by pressure from legislation and the need to 237 
demonstrate compliance, market requirements and the development of more simplified ‘HACCP-based’ 238 
approaches. Sector specific hygiene codes or self-checking guides were developed in some countries, 239 
often aimed to help businesses meet their responsibilities under regulations such as EU No. 852/2004. For 240 
example, Safer Food Better Business (FSA, 2017) was first launched in the UK in 2005, Belgium developed 241 
self-checking systems for multiple sectors (Jacxsens et al. 2015), and in the Netherlands sector specific 242 
HACCP hygiene codes were developed to support food businesses in designing their FSMS (Luning et al. 243 
2002; Van der Spiegel et al. 2005). 244 
 Around the same time that modular HACCP systems started to evolve in manufacturing, a further 245 
key development in FSMS design emerged, the concept of formalized prerequisite programs (PRPs). Food 246 
businesses had previously understood the need for GHPs or GMPs and most applied these within their 247 
operations, albeit with a lack of formality in terms of monitoring and verification. Early HACCP teams had a 248 
tendency to identify repetitive general hygiene issues as the cause of potential food safety hazards and 249 
this, combined with a lack of understanding of the hazard analysis process itself (Wallace, Holyoak, Powell, 250 
& Dykes, 2014) led to identification of large numbers of CCPs, e.g. 600 CCPs in a dry goods mixing 251 
operation (Wallace & Williams, 2001).  Although there were critics in the early days (Wallace & Williams, 252 
2001), the PRP concept is successful because it reduces the complexity of HACCP systems, and 253 
recognizes the difference between process CCPs and PRPs (Escriche, Domenech & Baert, 2006; 254 
Mortimore & Wallace, 1998, 2011). Several definitions of PRPs have been published such as the basic 255 
conditions and activities that are necessary within the organization and throughout the food chain to 256 
maintain food safety (ISO, 2018). Process CCPs, situated at a process step such as cooking, metal 257 
detection, sieving etc., are specifically designed to reduce a food safety hazard to a safe level. Procedures 258 
and protocols under the umbrella of a PRP reduce overall food safety risk e.g. cleaning and disinfection, 259 
pest control, effective maintenance programs, etc. Therefore, PRPs address and mitigate the general food 260 
hygiene issues in any food operation in a foundational way allowing the HACCP approach to focus on 261 
specific process hazards that are significant for food safety (Figure 2).   262 
Take in Figure 2 263 
 264 
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 Further development of the PRP concept came with the understanding that some general hygiene 265 
considerations required an additional, tighter or enhanced level of control, usually to prevent cross-266 
contamination risks that would lead to the ingress of significant hazards, for example allergen control where 267 
special measures are required to prevent cross-contact (Manning & Soon, 2017).  These types of food 268 
safety issues cannot be managed as process CCPs; however, they require more focus than general PRPs 269 
that are global rather than hazard specific in nature (Figure 2). This development led to the introduction of 270 
the Operational Prerequisite Program (OPRP) concept within BS EN ISO 22000:2005 (Gaze, 2009, 2015). 271 
Use of OPRPs tends to be in those organizations seeking certification to ISO 22000:2005 or similar 272 
schemes, but there has been much debate among practitioners as to whether OPRPs are a useful addition 273 
to FSMS or whether they lead to an extra level of confusion as to how food safety hazards are managed 274 
(Mortimore & Wallace, 2013).  The evolving definitions of OPRPs from being ‘a PRP defined by the hazard 275 
analysis as essential in order to control the likelihood of introducing food safety hazards to and/or the 276 
contamination or proliferation of food safety hazards in the products or in the processing environment’ (ISO, 277 
2005) to a ‘control measure or combination of control measures applied to prevent or reduce a significant 278 
food safety hazard to an acceptable level, and where action criterion and measurement or observation 279 
enable effective control of the process and/or product’ (ISO, 2018) may not have helped to reduce 280 
confusion.  281 
 For early adopters and other subsequent organizations, the application of HACCP principles came 282 
as a form of retro-fit for existing products and processes, perhaps as a result of the need for compliance 283 
with third party supply chain standards or as new legislation made the application of HACCP-based systems 284 
mandatory, such as Regulation EU No. 852/2004. Applying HACCP to existing processes and products 285 
requires a mindset to assess existing food safety hazards and develop strategies to manage them as well 286 
as considering additional and emerging food safety hazards and the controls required to reduce the 287 
likelihood of their occurrence. The application of HACCP in terms of managing hazards and food safety risk 288 
is now considered. 289 
3.2 Application of HACCP – managing hazards and risk 290 
 The determination of which hazards in a given situation are significant for food safety and, 291 
therefore, need to be controlled at CCPs within the HACCP plan, or by operational PRPs, has historically 292 
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been addressed by the application of HACCP principle 1 (Codex, 2009).  However, this area of HACCP 293 
has been both poorly understood and poorly applied (Wallace et al. 2014). Often HACCP teams are able 294 
to identify potential food safety hazards of interest, but then fail to analyze them effectively in terms of their 295 
food safety significance in the context of the specific products produced and the processes employed and/or 296 
their potential effect on consumers i.e. the assessment of risk is not adequately situated. This is an area 297 
where further guidance was recommended by the Majvik Expert Colloquium on ‘HACCP – the way ahead’ 298 
(Codex, 2014) for consideration in the next Codex review, which is currently at Step 3 of the Codex process 299 
(Codex, 2017).   300 
 Whilst HACCP is commonly described as a risk management system, it is interesting that the term 301 
‘risk’ is not used in the application of HACCP principles (Codex, 2009).  In fact, ‘risk’ is not defined within 302 
the HACCP principles at all and the word only appears once in the Codex HACCP Annex, in the preamble, 303 
which states that ‘implementation should be guided by scientific evidence of risks to human health’ (Codex, 304 
2009). This omission of the term ‘risk’ is considered surprising by some food safety practitioners and, whilst 305 
many HACCP teams do use the term ‘risk assessment’ as part of HACCP, it too is not included in the Codex 306 
international HACCP standard. This may lead to substantial confusion about the process of risk evaluation 307 
regarding the responsibilities of food companies and those of national/regulatory agencies (Mortimore & 308 
Wallace, 2013).   309 
 Sperber (2001) states that hazard analysis is a qualitative, local decision-making process 310 
conducted by a manufacturing organization’s HACCP team taking several weeks or months to complete. 311 
In contrast, quantitative risk assessment is a decision-making process in which a numerical degree of risk 312 
is calculated for a particular hazard. Usually, large consortia that include regulatory, public health, 313 
academic, and industry partners conduct quantitative risk assessment activity typically requiring several 314 
months or years for completion (Sperber, 2001).  The clear distinction made by Sperber (2001) that hazard 315 
analysis is qualitative whereas risk assessment is quantitative is of value. Despite the Codex HACCP 316 
Guidelines requiring hazard analysis and the determination of significant hazards rather than risk 317 
assessment, problems around understanding of the nuances of terminology have contributed to the 318 
confusion about the appropriate application of HACCP principle 1 (Wallace et al. 2014). Monaghan, 319 
Augustin, Bassett, Betts, Pourkomailian and Zwietering (2017:726) report that risk assessment is a term 320 
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that can lead to confusion as it is applied to both “a scientific process consisting of formal components and 321 
quantification of levels of risk as outlined by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC, 2003) and a more 322 
general, qualitative approach based more on expert opinion.”  In addition, Jacxsens et al. (2016) report that 323 
risk assessment is hard to elaborate and to understand, and discuss the need for, and development of, 324 
training approaches for (semi-) quantitative probabilistic risk assessment calculations or qualitative risk 325 
rankings. Thus, the duality of use of the term risk assessment is a weakness in the evolution of FSMS. 326 
Whilst food safety risk is described at the regulatory level as “a function of the probability of an adverse 327 
health effect, and the severity of that effect, consequential to a hazard(s) in food” (EC, 1997), risk is not 328 
always seen purely in this way (Manning & Soon, 2013). Therefore, qualitative assessment of food safety 329 
risk can be influenced by scientific considerations, situational risk assessment, individual perceptions and 330 
the propensity and willingness of the organization to eliminate, mitigate, accept or outsource risk as 331 
highlighted in BS EN ISO 31000 (2018) and by Kleboth, Luning and Fogliano (2016).  332 
 Current approaches to hazard analysis and the identification of significant hazards involve the 333 
consideration of likelihood of occurrence and severity of potential effect for each hazard. Codex HACCP 334 
guidelines (2009) require the hazard analysis process to identify ‘hazards that are of such a nature that 335 
their elimination or reduction to acceptable levels is essential to the production of a safe food’. Further, the 336 
guidance for conducting hazard analysis states that ‘the likely occurrence of hazards and severity of their 337 
adverse health effects’ should be included, and that ‘qualitative and/or quantitative evaluation’ of the 338 
presence, survival, multiplication, production or persistence of hazards should be considered.  Historically, 339 
this has been difficult for organizations, in particular small businesses with limited or no technical resource. 340 
More recently, semi-quantitative assessment matrices have been developed that allow for a weighting of 341 
both the likelihood of the hazard or the severity of the hazard should it occur (Mortimore & Wallace, 2013, 342 
Manning, 2013, Manning & Soon, 2013). This can lead to a more priority-focused HACCP approach, but 343 
appropriate expertise and experience is still required to apply these matrices effectively (Wallace et al. 344 
2014). 345 
 Following hazard analysis, CCPs are identified, either via HACCP team decisions and experience 346 
or through use of the Codex HACCP decision tree, a binary questioning process with YES or NO answers 347 
resulting in the control of food safety hazards at a given point where deemed critical. The remaining Codex 348 
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HACCP principles describe how to manage, validate and verify CCPs, and the operation and effectiveness 349 
of the FSMS. The application of HACCP is just one element of a series of building blocks that underpin a 350 
FSMS: namely application of HACCP, safe design, development of appropriate PRPs, and adoption of 351 
essential management practices (Wallace et al. 2011) see Figure 3. 352 
 Take in Figure 3  353 
 354 
 The essential management practices that are elements of GMP and good agricultural practice 355 
(GAP) include: senior management commitment to food safety in terms of overall mission right through all 356 
layers of management within the organization; clear definition of roles and responsibilities with regards to 357 
managing food safety; and appropriate training and education. Further, the consideration of the resources 358 
required to develop and effectively implement the food safety program; the development of a documented 359 
and formalized FSMS with associated process records; and a drive for continuous improvement in meeting 360 
pre-defined food safety management goals and objectives are essential practices to adopt. Supplier– 361 
customer protocols require a clear definition of the inputs and outputs for given processes within the internal 362 
food manufacturing system and at interfaces between one organization and another. The clear 363 
communication of food safety criteria at these interfaces e.g. between supplier and manufacturer and 364 
manufacturer to distribution system is essential to ensure consistently safe food product and safe working 365 
practices (Manning, Baines & Chadd, 2006).  366 
Despite decades of encouragement and mandatory requirements to adopt HACCP approaches to 367 
develop FSMS, the global food sector still experiences major acute and chronic food safety incidents. 368 
Examples of product recalls in 2017 alone include for the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ninety 369 
five recalls, market withdrawals or food safety alerts for Listeria monocytogenes, twenty three for 370 
Salmonella spp. and, an emerging health hazard in 2017, eleven recalls for undeclared sildenafil (Viagra) 371 
in dietary supplements (FDA, 2017a). In the EU, an emerging food safety hazard too was fipronil, a toxigenic 372 
chemical. Globally, the 2017 European fipronil incident with direct and composite products affected 56 373 
countries and led to 117 notifications on the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed database (RASFF, 374 
2017). In 2018, the “needles in strawberries” incident in Australia brought concerns over deliberate 375 
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contamination of food (Manning, 2019). So does the HACCP hazard analysis approach deliver especially 376 
when considering emerging food safety hazards? 377 
 3.3 Challenges associated with the HACCP approach. 378 
 Has HACCP as a management tool been oversold as a total solution; a silver bullet? Should 379 
regulatory bodies and food manufacturers recognize that undertaking hazard analysis and developing an 380 
associated FSMS does not deliver zero food safety risk in food supply chains? Should there be more focus 381 
on FS-Culture, and its impact on how the FSMS is implemented and verified? These are all questions that 382 
arise when considering the challenges associated with implementing the HACCP approach. 383 
 Food safety incidents have been associated with multiple weaknesses and factors of influence. 384 
These include lack of knowledge, training and expertise (Wallace et al. 2005; Mensah & Julien, 2011; 385 
Wallace et al. 2012, 2014); a lack of awareness and commitment and failures in management or leadership 386 
(e.g. Peanut Corporation of America see Manning, Wallace & Soon, 2016; Manning 2017b); a breakdown 387 
in the implementation of a PRP or process design or a lack of resources (see case study of Maple Leaf 388 
Foods in Manning, 2017b), weak verification (Powell, Jacob & Chapman, 2011); or weak maintenance of 389 
the FSMS (see case study of XL Foods Inc. in Manning, 2017b). Many of these factors reflect a failure in 390 
organizational culture and conditions of control i.e. there is a cultural framing of a food safety program and 391 
FSMS that requires consideration. 392 
 In addition, it is important to recognize that HACCP is a tool for assessment and management of 393 
food safety hazards and is implemented effectively only if both the hazards and the means for their control 394 
are clearly identified, understood and communicated within the organization. Emerging types of food safety 395 
hazard, if unknown by those in the HACCP team tasked with developing, reviewing or re-validating a 396 
HACCP Plan and associated food safety program, will simply go under the radar until there is an incident 397 
associated with that hazard. Whilst pathogens may be recognized as potential food safety hazards, 398 
emerging chemical hazards such as fipronil, sildenafil, or pieces of golf ball in frozen hash browns (FDA, 399 
2017a) may not.  Further, the HACCP approach is often difficult to apply at farm level and there is a growing 400 
trend instead to develop risk-based preventive control processes (Monaghan et al. 2017).  401 
 A further contemporary challenge to the implementation of HACCP is the very definition of what a 402 
16 
 
food safety hazard is and what it is not especially in wider considerations of food safety, food quality, food 403 
fraud, and food defense. Spink and Moyer (2011) in seeking to characterize food fraud and food safety, 404 
and by inference the food safety hazards that need to be considered within hazard analysis as part of a 405 
HACCP approach, state that food safety addresses only the unintentional actions that make food injurious 406 
to health, whilst food fraud concerns intentional actions of adulteration, substitution and tampering. The 407 
Global Food Safety Initiative (2013) describes food defense as “the process to ensure the security of food 408 
and drink and their supply chains from all forms of intentional malicious attack including ideologically 409 
motivated attack leading to contamination or supply failure”. BRC (2015) considers food defense as the 410 
procedures adopted to assure the safety of raw materials and products from malicious contamination or 411 
theft whilst FDA (2017b) defines it as “the effort to protect food from intentional acts of adulteration where 412 
there is an intent to cause wide scale public health harm”. Recent literature has sought to create a typology 413 
for food defense to aid its assessment and mitigation (Manning, 2019). Therefore, in theory food defense 414 
concerns now sit outside the HACCP process, as these intentional contaminants are distinct from food 415 
safety hazards (Manning & Soon, 2016a). However, in practice within food businesses, the identification of 416 
areas that are vulnerable to food fraud and/or may require food defense countermeasures may involve the 417 
same personnel as those who implement HACCP and thus there is potential for confusion for organizations 418 
on where HACCP processes sits within wider aspects of food safety, food defence and food crime (Yoe & 419 
Schwartz, 2010; Wiśniewska, 2015).  This may be exacerbated by the use of similarly named systems of 420 
control, e.g. threat analysis critical control point (TACCP) and vulnerability analysis critical control point 421 
(VACCP) methodologies (Manning & Soon, 2016; Manning, 2019). Ultimately, as Kleboth et al. (2016) 422 
summarize, in ever more complex food supply chains, scandals and incidents persist and concerns over 423 
food safety, authenticity and wider aspects of food integrity mean that multi-layered private and public 424 
standards have evolved and these interact with the HACCP approach in a transactional approach to ensure 425 
food safety. These generic and often third party standards follow a risk reduction approach that seeks to 426 
consistently deliver safe and legal food and prevent harm to individuals and prevent organizational or 427 
reputational damage. Thus, regulatory bodies and food manufacturers recognize that undertaking hazard 428 
analysis and developing an associated FSMS alone does not deliver zero food safety risk in food supply 429 
chains and that additional, agile mechanisms need to be in place. The need to verify implementation of 430 
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FSMS means that there needs to be more focus on the associated FS-Culture. However what cultural 431 
factors are of influence that drive compliance with such public and private standards? 432 
4. Compliance approaches to food safety using food supply chain standards 433 
 434 
4.1 Evolution of food supply chain standards 435 
Increasingly, the impact of food safety failures on consumer health, reputation damage, confidence 436 
loss, and future sales, and associated safety and quality standards have gained wider interest in the food 437 
supply chain (Fulponi, 2006). Multiple terms about standards exist and for ease of differentiation these has 438 
been synthesized (Table 1) so they can be referred to in the paper.  439 
Take in Table 1 440 
As required by their stakeholders (e.g. government, retailers, customers), and often as a pre-requisite to 441 
either operating the business and/or as a means of accessing specific markets, companies use both public 442 
and private product and process standards to provide the basis upon which to design their food safety 443 
programs. In this context, the food safety program is considered to be the written document indicating how 444 
a food business will assure that food safety hazards associated with food handling activities of the business 445 
are effectively controlled (Luning et al. 2008, 2009; Jacxsens et al. 2015). Private standards are commonly 446 
stricter in terms of requirements than the public standards established in local legal frameworks (Fulponi, 447 
2006), i.e. they go beyond legislative compliance or ‘safe to supply’ and include the adoption of additional 448 
requirements and standard elements. Compliance with these private standards by a potential supplier is 449 
often a pre-requisite to market access i.e. if the organization cannot demonstrate compliance with these 450 
food safety standards then they cannot supply. Therefore, food business operators (FBO) translate these 451 
stakeholder requirements into their specific food safety programs and adapt the requirements of given 452 
system standards to their particular food business context (Luning et al. 2009, 2011a; Kirezieva et al. 2013). 453 
This strategy then frames, shapes and affects the actual FSMS that is adopted and its ongoing performance 454 
(Herath, Hassan & Henson, 2007; Luning et al. 2011b; Luning et al. 2015; Kirezieva et al. 2015a). Since 455 
the 1990s, the number of private third party standards has increased substantially (Table 2). This is due in 456 
part as a reaction to multiple food safety incidents and a need to regain consumer trust, developments in 457 
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product liability law, and the limited capacity of public bodies (Fulponi, 2006; Schulze, Albersmeier, Gawron, 458 
Spiller, & Theuvsen, 2008).  459 
Take in Table 2 460 
 461 
  From a market perspective, imposed retailer requirements, reduction of transaction costs, 462 
mitigation of supply chain risks, and to a lesser extent productivity and efficiency improvement have also 463 
stimulated the adoption of private standards by food organizations (Fulponi, 2006; Schulze et al. 2008; 464 
Spadoni, Lombardi, & Canavari, 2013; Latouche & Chevassus-Lozza, 2015). Indeed there are multiple 465 
drivers for standards development and adoption and also barriers to their adoption too (Figure 4). Private 466 
standards, such as the BRC Standard, IFS-Food, GLOBALG.A.P, SQF, and the Foundation for Food Safety 467 
Certification, (FSCC2000), have been widely adopted by the European food industry (Schulze et al. 2008; 468 
Herzfeld, Drescher, & Grebitus, 2011; Spadoni et al. 2013), and beyond at a global scale (Herzfeld et al. 469 
2011). Particularly in emerging countries with poor institutions and legal frameworks (Henson & Humprey, 470 
2010), private standards can support design and operation of FSMS and create access to global markets 471 
(e.g. Kirezieva et al. 2015a, 2015b; Kussaga, Luning, Tiisekwa, & Jacxsens, 2015; Nanyunja et al. 2016) 472 
or address the governance void for organizations seeking to extend their operation to those countries. The 473 
interplay between regulation and private food standards with regulation evolving from a ‘one size fits all’ to 474 
risk based-regulation is leading to a hybridization of food governance between public and private 475 
instruments (Verbruggen & Havinga, 2017a), which impacts FSMS design and operation (Kirezieva & 476 
Luning, 2017). Hybridization of food governance has occurred in two distinct dimensions: firstly the national 477 
and international dimension with the interplay of public governance and institutions such as Codex or the 478 
International Standards Organization (ISO); and secondly between government, producers and third-party 479 
organizations (Zhang, Qiao, Wang, Pu, Yu & Zheng, 2015; Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen & Havinga, 480 
2017b; Zhu, Huang & Manning, 2019). 481 
Take in Figure 4 482 
 483 
The role of the state and the role of the market can often be fluid, which suggests that there is dynamic 484 
coupling of societal and institutional risks, as described by the theory of risk colonization (Rothstein, Huber 485 
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& Gaskell, 2006). Prevalence of certification of private standards seems more likely in developed markets 486 
and food economies especially in countries with established trade relations with other countries or trading 487 
blocs, such as the EU where these standards have been developed and adopted for some time (Herzfeld 488 
et al. 2011).  Since 2005, most of the private standards previously described have evolved rapidly and, 489 
through industry input and an iterative approach, new versions are launched on a regular basis (Table 2). 490 
Development and modification of these standards sometimes reveal a mosaic approach where owners and 491 
developers of private standards take elements from different standards such as CAC Standards or ISO 492 
standards and integrate criteria with specific elements that address supply chain actors’ concerns with 493 
regard to a given food safety or other supply chain risk. Common tendencies observed in the evolution of 494 
private standards are an increase in strictness and a more prescriptive character in the discourse that 495 
surrounds the requirements, and the continuous addition of new clauses, sections, and modules (Table 2). 496 
Examples of this are the requirement for the use of HACCP as a baseline and the increasing numbers of 497 
additional risk assessments in the BRC Global Food Standard version 7, including that of the vulnerabilities 498 
associated with food crime and the inclusion of a clause on FS-Culture in version 8.  Furthermore, various 499 
scheme owners (e.g. IFS, GLOBALG.A.P, and BRC) introduced multiple new system standards for other 500 
(or upcoming) actors in the food supply chain, such as catering, packaging suppliers, food stores, 501 
distribution centers, and global markets (Table 2).  502 
Some standards (e.g. SFQ and GLOBALG.A.P) have modular approaches to enable “new entrants” to 503 
third party certification to allow organizations to sequentially advance the depth and scope of their FSMS 504 
i.e. the standard owners have a baseline “fit to supply” level standard as well as a higher level standards 505 
within their overall portfolio. The first iterations of the BRC standard (e.g. 1997) also had two levels: 506 
foundation and higher level and recommendations for good practice. For the same reason, in some 507 
countries local versions of GLOBALG.A.P standards were developed, like JapanGap, ChinaGap, MyGaP 508 
(Tey et al. 2016). Table 2 shows the increasing requirements of schemes with regards to verification 509 
activities and, therefore, auditor competences have become more formalized and rigorous, which leaves 510 
less room for nuanced interpretation and application of private standards in view of the specific business 511 
context. There has also been increased focus on ‘managerial’ requirements, such as senior management 512 
commitment, training, policy setting, and competence requirements, and recently attention is also given to 513 
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FS-Culture and unethical or illicit behavior. All these developments have contributed to a proliferation of 514 
elements and requirements within a given system standard often leading to extensive “checklist-based” 515 
approaches to product and system verification (Powell et al. 2011; Manning, 2018a). 516 
4.2 Challenges associated with third-party certification 517 
 Whilst there are advantages to using a checklist type approach in terms of auditor consistency, 518 
conversely this approach can cause “audit fatigue” (Petersen, 2009; Martz, 2010). Auditor fatigue will 519 
decrease the reliability of the verification activity and due to the rigid application and non-reflective use of a 520 
checklist can also drive “evaluation myopia”.  This also may lead to an inability of the auditor to identify side 521 
effects or side impacts during the audit i.e. they have a linear rather than a holistic auditing approach (Martz, 522 
2010; Manning, 2013, Manning & Soon, 2014, Manning, 2018a). Even though checklist based auditing 523 
might be technically correct, there may be no incentive for the auditor to identify wider material weaknesses 524 
or deficiencies in the FSMS (Flores-Miyamoto, Reij & Velthuis, 2014). Indeed, the considerable resources 525 
employed in developing manuals, guidebooks, protocols, and checklists for audits are wasted when the 526 
contribution of such tools to audit efficiency and effectiveness is unclear (Leeuw, 2011, Läikkö-Roto & 527 
Nevas, 2014). Albersmeier, Schulze, Jahn, & Spiller (2009) differentiated between what they described as 528 
checklist governance and contrasted this with the concept of risk-based audit programs that ensure 529 
optimum and cost effective utilization of verification resources (van Asseldonk & Velthuis, 2014). For micro 530 
and small sized organizations, the costs of demonstrating compliance with private standards can be 531 
challenging. Kleboth et al. (2016) proposed that complex systems risk-based auditing, rather than 532 
considering and increasing the amount of audit criteria and the level of detail or depth of audit, should focus 533 
on the identification, analysis and evaluation of evidence-based, actual, pressing and emerging systemic 534 
risks. As a result, such verification is more effective in determining the current state of the FSMS. 535 
In practice, food quality managers indicate that reactive, stricter and more specific requirements do not 536 
necessary lead to better performance of the FSMS (Kleboth & Strasser, 2013). The multiplication of 537 
certifications, the overlap in standards, the difficulty to integrate all standards in a given organization’s 538 
FSMS, and the inconsistencies in food product standards mean that many food supply chain actors suffer 539 
“audit fatigue” with regard to private standards resulting in the rising costs of assurance whilst retail prices 540 
remain stable (Sonntag, Theuvsen, Kersting,  & Otter, 2016).  As previously described, the commonly used 541 
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private standards in the food supply chain, have a typical checklist compliance based structure and it can 542 
be argued that due to the reactive nature of private standards’ evolution, issues are often addressed in 543 
multiple sections potentially leading to duplication and confusion. Moreover, the structure and elements 544 
included in private standards are not necessarily based on scientific concepts or quantitative risk 545 
assessment and as a result can seem arbitrary, especially where they are addressing an issue where the 546 
food safety risk to consumers is deemed as negligible (see also Monaghan et al. 2017).  547 
Other challenges that have been associated with private standards are the limited flexibility allowed in 548 
the auditors’ approach towards different situations that may arise within the organization, and the continued 549 
requirement for retailer driven supplier auditing, even though the organization may hold current, valid third 550 
party certification (Spadoni et al. 2014). If the private standard is very detailed with multiple clauses that 551 
need verification during an audit this may result in lower auditing quality in the longer term due to time 552 
pressure. Audits are only ever a ‘snapshot’ of actual performance (Powell et al. 2011) and third party 553 
certification relies on the organizational integrity of the auditee organization to reflect their daily practices 554 
during the audit. Moreover, the commercially driven limit on the time available to undertake the audit also 555 
results in frustrated companies that may have to meet/fulfill system standard requirements that do not make 556 
sense for their particular context or where, in their particular situation, the risk the standards are seeking to 557 
mitigate is minimal (Albersmeier et al. 2009; Kleboth et al. 2016).  558 
However, some organizations may be happy to comply with a prescriptive private standard because 559 
they are simply willing to allow others to make decisions for them. This can result in reduced agency and 560 
influence the degree of organizational engagement with the derived FSMS. The more prescriptive style of 561 
standard, aimed at supporting small and medium sized enterprises (SME’s) to facilitate the implementation 562 
of private standards is a form of paternalism. Prescriptive paternalism shifts the sense of ownership of the 563 
FSMS from having the full engagement of the organization’s management and staff to develop appropriate 564 
protocols to meet the needs of the organization, and instead accepting a FSMS development and 565 
implementation approach that can be described as a “line of least friction” application or a cost-benefit 566 
trade-off. Decisions in this context on how a FSMS is developed and implemented are affected by the 567 
dynamic aspects of the given task environment such as multi-level trade-offs, time pressure, weak feedback 568 
on the effect of management actions, the level of uncertainty, and perceived risk (Kerstholt, 1994).  569 
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4.3 Risk-based standards and transformational management 570 
The only private standard that uses the widely acknowledged iterative “process approach” rather than 571 
the prescriptive-approach just described is ISO 9001. The process approach concept is clearly grounded 572 
in science-based management principles. The fully restructured 2015 revision (ISO9001: 2015) evolved 573 
into a high level structure of the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle (based on Deming, 1986) and allows for 574 
more tailored translation of requirements by explicitly acknowledging the business context with its typical 575 
internal and external challenges, focused on both risks and opportunities. Indeed an Annex of the ISO 576 
22000: 2018 Standard for food safety management systems cross references between Codex HACCP 577 
principles (Codex 2009) and the requirements of the standard and includes the PDCA cycle approach and 578 
the interrelationship with HACCP. Panghal, Chhikara, Sindhu & Jaglan (2018) assert that ISO 22000 579 
embeds HACCP in a form that leads to a more effective and auditable FSMS that includes the need for 580 
continuous improvement. 581 
Prescriptive private standards, on the other hand, via their rigid structure and emphasis, may favor 582 
and/or create a reactive rather than a proactive mentality (culture) in those organizations seeking to 583 
implement the said standards. As the certificates (linked to the standards) are a form of “license to produce”, 584 
this then directly affects market access for individual organizations. This framing of third party certification 585 
may shift ownership of the need for compliance within the organization from being proactive and strategic 586 
to reactive and tactical. Across global supply chains, organizational motivation to gain certification may 587 
reflect a spectrum of cultural approaches to adopting the standards, systems and protocols required for 588 
regulatory compliance and to demonstrate compliance with procurement pre-requisites to supply.  589 
Commonly, food industries tend to implement supply chain standards in a transactional rather than a 590 
transformational way (Manning, 2017b). The transactional approach is often simply a technical goal and 591 
compliance driven, demanding that staff work according to prescribed requirements such as specifications, 592 
work instructions and procedures and determines appropriateness through prescribed compliance audits 593 
and other verification activities (Manning, 2017b). Transformational management is more culturally 594 
orientated and reflects activities to empower staff to implement system requirements and to “feel” that 595 
compliance is important, in fact essential, as most private standards drive the visual, concrete formalization 596 
of FSMS through requiring protocols, procedures, and associated compliance documentation; the element 597 
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that is most often used for verification. A prescriptive approach to developing and implementing private 598 
standards has been considered here, but a third approach is posited by the authors i.e. using a more holistic 599 
and cultural framing of the FSMS. Whilst a move away from compliance (checklist) based system design 600 
and verification to an outcomes based approach is of value, there are obvious concerns about bias being 601 
introduced and a lack of consistency of how standards are verified across the food supply chain. In a more 602 
risk-based, situational and targeted approach to verification, there is a drive for efficacy and efficiency and 603 
for continuous improvement in both the design and implementation of FSMS and in the third party 604 
certification process itself (Albersmeier et al. 2009).  Developing third party verification approaches into the 605 
future to become more outcomes-based or to use multiple sources of data is an emerging theme in the 606 
literature. The use of triangulation allows for comparison between different sources of evidence, especially 607 
in complex, socio-technical situations by counterbalancing the strengths and weaknesses of different 608 
methodologies and approaches and in doing so increase the credibility and depth of audit processes 609 
(Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012; Carugi, 2016; Jespersen & Wallace, 2017; Manning, 2018b; De Boeck, E., 610 
Jacxsens, L. Vanoverberghe, P. & Vlerick, P. 2018). This line of enquiry then gives rise to some questions. 611 
Does this result in the organization simply honing its FSMS to meet a set of prescribed and specific 612 
standard(s) rather than reflecting on the bespoke challenges associated with the food they produce and 613 
developing an FSMS that is situationally appropriate and valid? If instead, the FSMS design is driven by 614 
the need to comply with private standards that are specific, static/rigid, with strict/prescriptive requirements, 615 
is there then a trade-off taking place?  As a result of this trade-off does the organization lose staff buy-in, a 616 
sense of ownership, and then as a result carry reduced operability and practicability within the resultant 617 
FSMS they implement?  618 
The argument put forward here is that the design of private standards should be flexible enough that 619 
the organization can comply, and gain continued certification, through tailoring and allowing their FSMS to 620 
continually evolve to meet the dynamic requirements of the product, process, and the internal and external 621 
characteristics associated with the organization. Therefore, rather than simply a hazard-based transactional 622 
approach to food safety management, should organizations follow a more transformational systems-led 623 
and risk-based approach and as a result focus more on realizing the minimization of food safety risk in a 624 
given situation and context? A more holistic approach to food safety is now presented. 625 
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 626 
5. Holistic approaches to food safety and developing FSMS 627 
5.1 Risk and Context 628 
Perceptions of risk, held collectively or individually by stakeholders and actors in the food supply chain, 629 
including consumers, influence how FSMS are developed and implemented, as well as the degree of actor 630 
engagement with the processes that are required to ensure food is consistently safe and wholesome 631 
(Manning & Soon, 2016b). It is important to recognize that risk is being considered here and in the supply 632 
chain context, as previously outlined, this largely determined in a qualitative, or semi-quantitative approach 633 
that is framed by uncertainty, and ambiguity. Higher order systems driven by the interaction of regulation 634 
and enforcement surveillance and the interaction between international and national policy and associated 635 
market governance are interwoven and complex (Manning & Luning, 2018). Luning and Marcelis (2006) 636 
describe these higher order systems as chaotic, having greater ambiguity i.e. lack of clarity about the 637 
mechanisms of influence and uncertainty due to lack of information. As a result, such systems have less 638 
linearity, rationality and stability.  Vulnerability, uncertainty, and ambiguity are inherent attributes of internal 639 
and external organizational context factors, such as product and production related characteristics of the 640 
environment in which a FSMS operates (Luning & Marcelis, 2007, Luning et al. 2011a). Internal and external 641 
context factors influence the degree of risk associated with food products, processes and the associated 642 
public and private standards developed to mitigate such risk (Manning & Luning, 2018). In addition, context 643 
factors can be active i.e. influencing the organisation on a continuous basis or alternatively dormant 644 
awaiting a trigger factor that will then enact them. Luning et al. (2011a) distinguish four main context factors, 645 
which can affect control and assurance activities in a FSMS (Luning & Marcelis, 2007; Luning et al. 2011a; 646 
Kirezieva et al. 2013; Manning & Luning, 2018): 647 
 Product characteristics i.e. the intrinsic properties of initial materials and final products. 648 
 Production characteristics i.e. the extrinsic conditions utilized during primary production, 649 
processing, or handling. 650 
 Organisational characteristics specific to the organisation itself. These can be further subdivided 651 
into individual (people) characteristics, group characteristics (transformational characteristics 652 
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associated with food safety culture and quality culture), organisational structures (transactional 653 
division of tasks, responsibilities, rules, procedures), and information systems, which affect 654 
peoples’ decision-making behavior (see De Boeck, Jacxsens, Mortier & Vlerick, 2018); and 655 
 Chain characteristics i.e. the conditions during supply, and relationships within the supply chain.  656 
Context factors are characteristics of a system environment that can affect its performance and cannot be 657 
(easily) changed (Kirezieva et al. 2013:109).  More specifically, FSMS context factors are situational, 658 
structural elements in the FSMS that affect decision-making activities and as a result the output derived 659 
(Luning et al, 2011), and can be further characterized as narrow and broad context factors, or internal and 660 
external business characteristics (Table 3).  661 
Take in Table 3 662 
 External context factors that exert influence from the broader context include supply chain, socio-663 
political, legal and national factors (Kirezieva et al. 2015b). These are also called macro factors by Nayak 664 
and Waterson, (2016). Internal (or narrow) context factors include product, production, and organizational 665 
characteristics (Luning et al. 2011a; Kirezieva et al. 2013), and from a systems viewpoint are termed meso 666 
factors with the individual being the micro level (Nayak & Waterson, 2016). It is important to recognize that 667 
the context in which the FSMS operates is narrower than the overall operating environment (broad context) 668 
of the organization. The external environment can encompass wider context factors that can still affect 669 
overall food safety output and delivery of safe food (Luning et al. 2011b, Kirezieva et al. 2015b). Using a 670 
process (input-activity-output) approach, triggers can be described as the inputs/influence on an 671 
organization that arise from the business environment, either internal or external to the organization. 672 
Extrinsic triggers can be initiated and driven by a range of supply chain actors and wider stakeholders and 673 
include changes in customer requirements that influences intrinsic and extrinsic product characteristics 674 
which in turn may have an impact on food safety, for example reformulation of products to reduce salt and 675 
sugar levels. Triggers can influence an organization singularly or in consort, harmoniously or in discord. 676 
The impact of the combination of individual or concerted internal and/or external triggers is to create 677 
organizational and wider supply chain uncertainty. It can be postulated that internal trigger factors include 678 
changes such as new production systems, technology, and new individuals in key management positions. 679 
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Examples of potential internal and external triggers have been synthesized (Table 4).  680 
Take in Table 4 681 
The structure of the organization and the associated FSMS will be specific to the given business i.e. it can 682 
have either a central focus of food safety control or a more decentralized hierarchy (Luning & Marcelis, 683 
2009). The interactions of strategic, tactical, and operational decision-making are as a result, situationally 684 
framed. Moreover, the hierarchy of decision-making and given determination of food safety “meaning” has 685 
a strong influence on the culture that surrounds the FSMS and thus is worthy of consideration here 686 
(Nyarugwe, Linnemann, Hofstede, Fogliano, & Luning, 2016).  687 
Take in Table 5 688 
Table 5 provides examples of the types of decision-making that occurs at these three levels within 689 
an organization: strategic, tactical, and operational. Nayak and Waterson (2017) argue that management 690 
and decision-making at levels of an organization matters in terms of FS-Culture stating that if senior 691 
management is too focused on profit generation, and this combines with a dissonance between senior 692 
management and employees then the result is a failure to set the example of a positive FS-Culture. 693 
Furthermore, social networks affect the efficacy of the FSMS. The overall food safety climate (FS-Climate) 694 
of an organization is the convergence of individual characteristics such as beliefs, values, and perceptions 695 
into group characteristics (De Boeck et al. 2015). Thus the socio-technical interactions that frame the 696 
development, validation and implementation of the FSMS are crucial to its efficacy and alternatively if there 697 
is a negative socio-techncial influence can underpin its vulnerability and potential failure too. 698 
5.2 Socio-technical systems 699 
 Luning and Marcelis (2006) suggest that a techno-managerial approach with increased levels of 700 
information reduces uncertainty; and if as a result greater knowledge is instilled into individuals also reduces 701 
ambiguity. However, dynamic FSMS remain difficult to fully predict in terms of both human behavior and 702 
also product and production failure (Luning & Marcelis, 2007). De Boeck et al. (2015) combine in their study, 703 
the techno-managerial route (based on Luning & Marcelis, 2006, Luning et al. 2011a) to assess FSMS and 704 
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also the individual human factors, as they influence the implementation of the FSMS. People in 705 
organizations interacting with the technological system create “socio-technical systems” (Bronfenbrenner, 706 
1986; Bostrom & Heinen, 1977; Ghaffarian, 2011; Winter, Berente, Howison & Butler, 2014).  It is important 707 
to recognize that FSMS are not operating in isolation, instead they are an element within wider 708 
organizational and supply chain socio-technical systems, and the influence of internal and external triggers 709 
means that they operate in a situational business/environment context that can set boundaries on the 710 
design, application and implementation of the FSMS i.e. the socio-technical system can be multi-level.  711 
Further, effective FSMS require the embedding of systems thinking and a clear acknowledgement and 712 
understanding of the complexity of the socio-technical systems that provide the context in which they 713 
operate (Kirezieva et al. 2015a; 2015b). Nayak and Waterson (2016) analysed the causes of two foodborne 714 
outbreaks rooted in six system levels, which together shape the socio-technical system in which an 715 
organization and its FSMS operate: 716 
1. Government level: Where regulation is developed to control food safety.   717 
2. Regulatory bodies and association level: Where regulation is translated into industry rules and 718 
standards designed to address food safety.   719 
3. Organizational level: Where the industry rules and regulation are integrated into the organizational 720 
and situational rules and policies.   721 
4. Management level: Where the staff activities and roles are specified and overseen with reference 722 
to the organizational level rules and policies.   723 
5. Staff level: Where the staff or work force are required to follow the rules set by their managers, 724 
and  725 
6. Equipment and surroundings level: Where the organization’s situational rules and policies are 726 
applied to ensure compliance with government regulations, industry rules and standards and 727 
organizational rules and policies. 728 
Further, using this approach means there needs to be a shift from hazard-orientated (particularly 729 
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microbiological hazard-oriented) food safety management approaches to a more holistic socio-technical 730 
approach that address the causes of food safety issues that occur at each level (Nayak & Waterson, 2016) 731 
and it could also be argued at the interfaces between different levels (Manning, 2017b; Jespersen et al. 732 
2019). Indeed, perceptions of food safety risk at the organizational level are neither quantitative nor 733 
necessarily a ‘qualitative approach based on expert opinion’ (Monaghan et al. 2017). In reality, food safety 734 
risk assessment at the organizational and supply chain level is influenced by perceptions, social norms, 735 
and constructs of meaning. Thus, the role of these cultural influences on FSMS design and application 736 
cannot be ignored. 737 
5.3 influence of FS-Culture and FS-Climate 738 
Social representations drive collective meaning-making and common recognition produces social 739 
bonds based on dialogues, discourse, emotions, attitudes, and judgments that unite organizations and 740 
groups (Höijer, 2011). Thus, social representations bound the implementation of FSMS and the associated 741 
decision-making that occurs. Worldviews are the social, psychological, and political factors that influence 742 
an individual’s risk judgments (Slovic, 1999) and thus are of importance when considering individual and 743 
collective perceptions of food safety risk and its meaning both to consumers and to individuals that work 744 
within food businesses throughout the supply chain. Worldviews are generalized attitudes towards the world 745 
and its social organization (Peters, Burraston & Mertz, 2004); or the shared mental representations, values 746 
and general social, cultural and political attitudes held by a group of individuals (Leiserowitz, 2003).  Van 747 
der Linden (2015) considers the concept of “values” as differing from worldviews in two ways: firstly, that 748 
values precede worldviews and secondly that values are guiding principles with greater specificity and are 749 
more stability than worldviews. These socio-cultural factors can influence the organization in terms of how 750 
people interact with complex systems and context factor characteristics and the need, on occasions, to 751 
make decisions based on limited information. In this circumstance, meaning is an important personal 752 
construct that links people to their environments and as a result influences their perception of a given 753 
function or activity (Rapoport, 1988; Coolen & Ozaki 2004) and potentially their perception of a given food 754 
safety risk. Translating from their original subject area to consideration of food safety, Rapoport’s (1988) 755 
three levels of meaning suggests that: high-level or macro meanings are related to worldviews, heuristics 756 
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and philosophical systems for example consideration of the cost of implementing the FSMS versus the 757 
benefit derived; middle level or meso meanings convey latent functions such as group identity, status, 758 
wealth, power, and are represented via organizational structures and hierarchy within a given business; 759 
and lower-level or micro meanings are everyday and instrumental meanings and identity as perceived 760 
by the individual.  In all organizations an informal, often invisible, system derived from these cultural aspects 761 
operates alongside the formal visible processes of the FSMS (see the work of Schein, 1985; Griffith, 2014 762 
and others).  Interpreting the FS-Culture levels of Griffith (2014) suggests that each organization e.g. a food 763 
manufacturing business, will be unique in terms of the exact combination and interaction of these levels of 764 
organizational culture and as a result this will influence the effectiveness of the FSMS (Manning, 2017b).   765 
Culture as a construct describes the emergent history and traditions that give meaning to the 766 
underlying values and beliefs held by members of formal and informal social groupings (Buchann & 767 
Huczynski, 2004; Griffith, Livesey & Clayton, 2010). For any given organization there will be a distinct set 768 
of values and beliefs (Powell et al. 2011) that form a heterogeneous rather than singular framing (Griffiths 769 
et al. 2010) that is described in the context of this paper, specifically as FS-Culture. FS-Culture is defined 770 
as shared values, beliefs and norms that affect mindset and behavior toward food safety in, across and 771 
throughout an organization (GFSI, 2018).  Griffith (2014) described three levels of FS-Culture: 772 
Level 1 - Food safety climate (FS-Climate): the outermost layer of food business culture that is considered 773 
during verification, auditing and inspection activity and is observable (Griffith, 2014). This level of FS-Culture 774 
can be modified depending on the situation and the internal and external conditions or constraints e.g. lack 775 
of resources, people, or an event such as the presence of the auditor/inspector. De Boeck et al. (2015) 776 
describe food safety climate as the relative priority or the “meaning” given to food safety in an organization 777 
or work unit as perceived individually or collectively by employees.  778 
Level 2 - Underpinning culture: the middle layer includes the organization’s espoused values (often 779 
unspoken) and guides the employees’ behavior and attitudes to authority and legislation. Depending on the 780 
depth of verification activity, this level of culture can be examined and measured. 781 
Level 3 – Core culture: the innermost layer that contains all the beliefs and assumptions by staff as 782 
individuals or groups about what the organization stands for. This level includes core values that are 783 
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invisible and often assumed. Depending on the depth and scope of any verification activity this level may 784 
remain hidden. 785 
Nayak and Waterson (2017) summarize the difference between FS-Culture and FS-Climate as FS-Culture 786 
referring to behavioral aspects i.e. what people do; and also the situational aspects of the organization i.e. 787 
what the company has in terms of products, processes and facilities; whilst FS-Climate refers to the 788 
psychological characteristics of employees in an organization i.e. how people feel and the meanings they 789 
derive with regard to food safety. FS-Climate is alternatively defined as the employees’ (shared) perceptions 790 
of leadership, communication, commitment, resources and risk awareness concerning food safety and 791 
hygiene within their current work organization, however the construct is more temporal and subjective than 792 
representing the individual employee’s perception of an organization (De Boeck et al. 2015, 2018).  Third 793 
party verification activities can only ever capture a “brief glimpse” of the FS-Climate and, to date the third 794 
party audit approach has not been developed to assess FS-Culture specifically. However, a requirement 795 
for objective evidence of planning for the continual improvement of FS-Culture is being introduced into 796 
private standards (BRC, 2018).    797 
   Sub-cultures are separate from the dominant, overarching culture and can be categorized 798 
functionally (Hofstede, 1997), geographically (Hofstede, 2001), nationally (Hofstede, 2001; Jespersen & 799 
Huffman, 2014) or by the collective identity or values that are shared by the members of the sub-culture 800 
(Khatib, 1996). In addition, contingency situations, such as product failure, increased orders, or inadequate 801 
training can influence the interfaces between sub-cultures, causing competitive interaction, barriers and 802 
conflict to occur especially where primary values and worldviews within sub-cultures are not congruent 803 
across the organization (Manning, 2017b). Functional interfaces such as those between quality and 804 
production; production and engineering; production and finance; production and procurement all influence 805 
both the formal and the informal aspects of an organization’s FS-Culture. Indeed, Jespersen et al. (2019) 806 
propose a dynamic model of food safety culture based on the building blocks a) organizational 807 
effectiveness, b) organizational culture norms, c) working group learned and shared assumptions and 808 
behaviors and d) individual intent and behaviors, and highlight the integration of and the interactions 809 
between these building blocks as crucial to the necessary maturation of FS-Culture.  Multi-level interactions 810 
and interfaces may be visible during the monitoring and verification activities undertaken to measure the 811 
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FS-Culture maturity and effectiveness, but equally may also be translucent or invisible during formal 812 
processes such as an external audit (Manning, 2017b). The formalization of food safety controls and 813 
management systems evolve from the FS-Culture and FS-Climate in a given organization and thus the FS-814 
Culture frames and, depending on its level of maturity, enables the FSMS.  Conversely a weak FS-Culture 815 
would be expected to restrict the efficacy of the FSMS, but further empirical research is needed to support 816 
this conclusion. The mechanisms of both formalization and informal drivers are considered in various 817 
studies (e.g. Nyarugwe et al. 2016; Manning 2017b; Nyarugwe, Linnemann, Nyanga, Fogliano, & Luning, 818 
2018). Therefore, developing FSMS in isolation without regard for the perceptions and meaning of food 819 
safety, FS-Culture and FS-Climate, or sub-cultures within that organization is of limited value. Whilst FSMS 820 
are formally developed to address the requirements of public or private standards and/or the context of a 821 
specific business setting they may firstly be inappropriate for the FS-Culture or FS-Climate in the given 822 
organization and secondly may not be effectively and consistently implemented throughout the 823 
organization.  824 
Moving from a static approach to food safety management (i.e. focused on system elements and 825 
product and process compliance with prescribed standards) to a more dynamic, holistic and risk-based 826 
approach with a focus on the interactions and dynamics of the organization itself requires new forms of 827 
socio-technical systems thinking. The cultural and behavioral factors associated with the people employed 828 
in the organization means that primarily the organization must truly understand itself in terms of structure, 829 
and internal and external triggers, which are often specific to its activities.  Most importantly, the meaning 830 
of food safety within the organization, which is far more nuanced than simply undertaking hazard analysis, 831 
and defining risk appetite, risk management and mitigation, must be defined and understood. This holistic 832 
approach extends beyond the narrow use of HACCP principles and the development of a food safety plan; 833 
is mediated by both internal and external triggers, which are constantly evolving and changing; and is 834 
framed by contextual factors that are specific to the organization and its wider supply chain. A static FSMS 835 
and associated FS-Culture will be limited with its modus operandi in terms of addressing and mediating the 836 
uncertainty and ambiguity associated with ever changing food safety risk. Whilst seeking to measure and 837 
determine FS-Culture is important (Emond & Taylor, 2018; Nayak & Taylor, 2018), there are however 838 
challenges to assessing FS-Culture effectively in practice (Nayak & Waterson, 2015; Jespersen et al. 2017; 839 
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Jespersen & Wallace 2017; Nyarugwe at al., 2018; Kane, Taylor & Teare, 2018; Taylor, Caccamo, Daniel 840 
& Bulatovic-Schumer, 2018; Taylor & Rostron, 2018). The conceptualization of a holistic view of the FSMS 841 
is therefore much more multi-layered and nuanced than the simple development of PRPs, OPRPs, and 842 
identifying and managing process CCPs for food safety. A failure to implement a systems based approach 843 
means the use of private standards will continue to be a shallow, rather than a deep form of implementation 844 
and verification with associated limitations in the ability to deliver in terms of reducing the likelihood of food 845 
safety incidents. However, it is questionable what supply chain incentives exist for a more thorough 846 
evaluation and adoption of the holistic approach, e.g. by deepening third party certification, supplier, and 847 
internal audits and by augmenting these with valid FS-Culture measurement systems. The hybridization of 848 
food governance and retreat of regulatory mechanisms in favor of private standards and earned recognition 849 
should mean that private verification mechanisms will be driven to be deeper and more holistic in nature. 850 
However, the exact combination and form that these mechanisms need to take is yet to be determined and 851 
further research is needed both to establish the precise nature of this holistic culture-systems-practice 852 
approach and how to assess maturity and effectiveness of the associated holistic FSMS and FS-Culture. 853 
6. The evolution of FSMS – where next? 854 
 855 
Food companies operate in an increasingly complex highly interdependent food supply chain network 856 
and face multiple challenges associated with developing, implementing and verifying their FSMS in order 857 
to effectively manage food safety. Varzakas and Jukes (1998) argued that globalization has driven global 858 
integration and standardization of markets and complex interdependence that has then led to the 859 
emergence of isomorphism in structures, attitudes, and norms especially within transnational corporations. 860 
Manning, Soon, de Aguiar, Eastham and Higashi (2017) noted that the concept of supply chain pressure 861 
has increasingly emerged within supply chain literature over the last decade especially the notion of 862 
integration and greater isomorphic pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Delmas & Toffel, 2004; van 863 
Plaggenhoef, 2007; Sarkis, Zhu & Lai, 2011; Gimenez, Sierra & Rodan, 2012; Esfahbodi, Zhang, Watson 864 
& Zhang 2017; Manning, 2018c). In essence, homogenization, or isomorphism, creates and spreads a 865 
common set of values, norms, and rules, which then results in similar practices and organizational 866 
structures (Othman, Ahmad & Zailani, 2009) often driven by a need to conform not only to the external 867 
33 
 
environment, but also the context that the environment itself promotes (Czinkota, Kaufmann & Basile, 868 
2014). Indeed, isomorphism occurred in the work to establish international HACCP guidance through the 869 
‘invisible college of HACCP experts (Demortain, 2007, p9 ) and can be seen as a natural effect of the 870 
comments and critical review cycles that form the step procedure for elaborating Codex Standards (FAO, 871 
no date a & b) and within the consensus approach of industry benchmarking of private standards, as 872 
undertaken through both GLOBALG.A.P activities and the work of the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). 873 
The process of benchmarking itself can drive isomorphism as private standard owners seek to demonstrate 874 
private standard equivalence. Therefore, both the resultant organizational FSMS and FS-Culture that are 875 
informed by these standards are influenced a series of rational myths. Institutionalized rules, and norms, 876 
and increasingly the structural similarity of private standards creates contiguous cultural myths, symbols, 877 
rules and regulations (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) across the food industry. 878 
Customer pressure for a supplying organization to use a certain third party private standard or the 879 
customer’s own standards requirements further complicates the picture. This supply chain pressure of 880 
compliance can result in a transactional approach that seeks to develop an FSMS to meet the required 881 
standards rather than because it is the right approach for the products manufactured and the processes 882 
employed, and the right way to protect the consumer. Indeed the drive for compliance and to eliminate 883 
deviance may weaken FSMS in the future. The deviance of employees from organizational norms can have 884 
negative outcomes for the organization, but can also be a form of constructive deviance that is beneficial 885 
and leads to positive change that drives innovation and entrepreneurship in food safety management as 886 
products, systems and processes (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2003; Galperin & Burke, 2006). Questions 887 
remain as to whether the current transactional industry approach to managing food safety is sufficient.  888 
Nevertheless, further research is needed to establish  what  a more systems and risk-based holistic food 889 
safety management framework would look like, how  it would address both formal and informal aspects of 890 
FSMS and FS-culture and how it would work in practice within food organizations. The reactive mindset of 891 
managing as a result of external triggers is well established and further clarity is needed about the roadmap 892 
to develop a more proactive mindset that is dynamic enough to meet the needs of a given organization and 893 
wider supply chain.  894 
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Organizations are experiencing greater proliferation of private standards and the implementation of 895 
ever more requirements, standards and additional protocols, but it is unknown whether this transactional, 896 
compliance-driven supply chain approach can actually lead to better (predictable and consistent) product 897 
safety; in fact it is proposed that a saturation point has been reached (Kleboth et al. 2016) and the food 898 
sector may be facing a simple process of ever diminishing returns.  Kleboth et al. (2016) describe this 899 
approach as the ‘reactive food control vicious cycle’. This situation is caused initially after a food incident 900 
when the degree of mistrust in the food industry increases and then, depending on the degree of personal 901 
and financial impact of the given food safety incident, there is pressure from food chain actors and 902 
stakeholders to implement appropriate corrective actions. Consequently, to avoid incidents in the future, 903 
more and/or stricter standards are required; and then the cycle starts over again when a new food scandal 904 
occurs. This approach could also be called “protocolization”, i.e. the formalization of organizational 905 
operations as a response to minimizing issues of blame and liability (Hood & Rothstein, 2001); and 906 
increasing bureaucratization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).   907 
Rothstein et al. (2006:97) assert that assessment of risk is “a way of formalizing organizational 908 
operations in order to provide bureaucratically rational ‘due diligence’ defenses in the face of increased 909 
accountability pressures.” Due diligence in itself drives the complexity and scale of risk elimination and risk 910 
management approaches (Manning & Luning, 2018). As has been explored in this paper a risk assessment 911 
is a much more in-depth and quantitative approach when compared with the process of hazard assessment. 912 
Thus food safety risk assessment extends beyond the use of HACCP as a tool to develop, implement and 913 
verify a FSMS. The construct of HACCP uses hazard analysis as a transactional tool to determine the 914 
likelihood and severity of food safety hazards at the food business level and to identify the measures that 915 
can be implemented to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or the severity should they occur. In wider 916 
business literature, risk is described as a combination of the probability of an occurrence of a particular 917 
threat and the possible subsequent impacts (Slovic, 2002); or as a measure of a hazard that can result in 918 
‘threat to people and what they value’ (Kates & Kasperson, 1983). Whilst there are clear similarities between 919 
these definitions, there are also differences in the way that risk is being expressed and this suggests there 920 
is an inherent meaning to an individual or group associated with the qualitative determination of risk. 921 
Therefore, risk is determined through a politicized process and contextualized as a social construct 922 
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(Masuda and Garvin, 2006) influencing at the supply chain level who manages, mitigates, reduces or 923 
outsources any given risk. Managing risk in a holistic way is an integrative process where different actors 924 
may bring their different interpretations of risk but the focus on the interactions and dynamics of the 925 
organization and its environment is to consistently produce safe and legal food.  Thus understanding the 926 
cultural aspects that frame food safety risk assessment is crucial to ensuring that the systems used are 927 
appropriate, valid and effective. The food industry is recognizing the importance of FS-Culture and the 928 
necessity to consider at the food organization level how FS-Culture informs and frames the perceptions of 929 
food safety risk and the implementation of FSMS and PRPs. Understanding the prevailing FS-Culture and 930 
how, where it is necessary, to improve it remains a key challenge for every organization. 931 
 932 
7. Conclusion 933 
The concept and factors that influence the structure of FSMS in individual organizations has evolved over 934 
the last 75 years.  Key milestones include the international acceptance of HACCP principles and their 935 
application in food businesses to develop appropriate, valid and effective FSMS. However the application 936 
of HACCP principles is not without its challenges and retrospective investigation and analysis of foodborne 937 
illness data demonstrates that HACCP systems are not always working effectively in practice. HACCP 938 
principles have been one of the cornerstones of the development of private food safety standards, but these 939 
standards have tended to evolve in a mosaic way, with new topics and requirements being added each 940 
time they are revised. This can result in standards that are prescriptive and inflexible and drive the 941 
development of a least cost FSMS rather than the development of an appropriate outcomes based food 942 
safety system.  This mindset has led not only to questions about where this trend will end but also has led 943 
to  a type of food safety management in food organizations that is more transactional and compliance driven 944 
than transformational and having cultural maturity.  The realization that FSMS cannot be stand-alone 945 
technical systems but are part of and impacted by the social context within which they operate has been 946 
an important driver for evolution. Research has led to the cultural framing of FSMS through better 947 
understanding of the FS-Culture and FS-Climate constructs. As these academic approaches cascade down 948 
to the development of private systems standards this should allow further enhancement of food safety 949 
performance and also industry mechanisms for verification of FSMS.   950 
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The concept of socio-technical systems is now being used to inform food safety management 951 
research, but further work is needed to establish how FSMS, practices and culture relate to and interact 952 
with each other at multiple system levels, and at cultural interfaces in order to reveal a model of the risk-953 
based holistic approach to food safety management that can be widely adopted and inform better food 954 
safety management in the future. 955 
 956 
8. Author Contributions (required for JFS original research manuscripts) 957 
All authors designed and contributed to all the sections in the review.  Initially each author concentrated 958 
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critically reviewing, extending and developing the initial drafts.   961 
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Table 1: Multiple definitions and descriptions associated with public and private standards 1665 
(Adapted from Meuwissen, Velthuis, Hogeveen & Huirne, 2003; Henson & Reardon 2005; Fulponi, 1666 
2006; Theuvsen & Spiller 2007; Schulze, Albersmeier, Gawron, Spiller, & Theuvsen, 2008; 1667 
Schaarschmidt, 2016) 1668 
 1669 
 1670 
Term Description / definition 
Certification The (voluntary) assessment and approval by an accredited party on an accredited standard 
Legally-mandated 
private standards 
Standards developed by the private sector, which are then made mandatory by public 
bodies.  
Private standard/ 
Optional laws 
Public (voluntary) standards are created by public bodies and the adoption is voluntary, 
these standard are also called ‘optional laws’. Standards developed and adopted by private 
bodies. 
Process-oriented 
standards 
Standards aimed at assuring that processes are designed, validated and verified in 
accordance to certain requirements on e.g. food safety, quality, environment-friendly, 
welfare etc.). 
Product-oriented 
standards  
Set requirements on particular products and or ingredients. Define specifications for 
individual products or product groups aimed at harmonizing product quality to facilitate 
trade and to avoid consumer fraud. Examples are: gluten free, ISO product standards with 
requirements on pesticides, mycotoxins, heavy metals, etc.  
Public 
standard/regulations 
Standards enacted in laws, also called regulations.  
Quality standards Quality standards refer to specific schemes for assurance of high quality line products 
usually associated with culinary products with particular gustative attributes. 
Standard Measures by which products, processes and producers are judged  
Standard owner Standard owners can be (local) governments (state-run systems e.g., organic farming in 
Denmark); international standardization organisations (e.g., ISO 9001 and 22000), specific 
stakeholders (e.g., Fairtrade); producer schemes (e.g., farmers' associations); private 
inspection bodies (e.g. Lloyds); retailer driven schemes (e.g., BRC Global Standard and 
IFS)  
System-oriented 
standards 
Standards setting requirements on (e.g. management) systems (like IFS, ISO9001:2015) 
 1671 
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Table 2: Evolution of internationally acknowledged private standards used in food supply chains- illustrations of changes in standards 1673 
 1674 
Period Introducti
on 
standard 
Time periods wherein major modifications of standards were launched 
2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 >2015 
1985-
1994 
1987- 
ISO9000 
Series 
2000-ISO9001 
-structural change towards 
process model;  
- based on management 
principles  
-customer focus, consistency 
& traceability; 
- focus on leadership; 
- people involvement;  
- systems approach;  
- continual improvement;  
- factual decision-making; 
-mutual beneficial supplier 
relations 
2008-ISO9001 
clarification of 
requirements and 
consistency with 
ISO14.000 
2015-ISO9001 
-structural change to high level structure 
plan-do-check-act;  
-new clause structure based on 
management principles 
- context (e.g. know all stakeholders, 
process risks);  
-leadership (e.g. alignment quality policy 
with strategic decisions on risks);  
-focus on risks and opportunities; support 
(meet e.g. customer demands);  
-operation (e.g. contingency planning, 
control outsourced activities);  
- performance evaluation;  
-structured approach for continual 
improvement 
 
1995-
2000 
1995-
SQF1000/ 
SQF2000 
  2010-2013  
-new safety fundamentals for animal 
production, animal conversion, feed, 
storage & distribution 
2014-SQF  
-redesigned for all sectors (replaced 
SQF2000 and SQF1000; 
-new sections added; 
-scored surveillance audits;  
-new guidance documents 
2016-SQF(vs8)  
-tighter practitioners requirements;  
-unannounced audits;  
-recall tracking;  
-fraud GFSI tool;  
-revision technical elements 
1997-
EUREP 
GAP 
 2007- 
GLOBALG.A.P 
renaming 
2007-local GAPS 
e.g. Asian GAPS, 
China GAP, 
JapanGap, 
VietGAp, MyGap_ 
national GAPS 
-2013 GLOBALG.A.P + Add-on product.   
- introduction of GLOBALG.A.P Risk 
Assessment on Social Practice (GRASP), 
which includes a voluntary module for risk 
assessment on social practice, 
addressing specific aspects of workers’ 
health, safety and welfare. 
2014- GLOBALG.A.P 
- introduction new Harmonized Produce 
Safety Standard (HPSS) to serve need of 
US fruit & vegetable producers to align 
with FDA 
 
2018 GLOBALG.A.P 
-addition Produce Handling Assurance 
Standard (PHAS) covering pre- process 
production after harvesting 
2016- GLOBALG.A.P 
-modular approach with modules for all 
farm types; part I quality management 
rules, part II certification and accreditation 
rules 
2015 GLOBALG.A.P 
-Revision of GRASP 
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1997-
BRC  
2005-BRC 
-introduction additional BRC 
standards (packaging, 
consumer products, storage 
& distribution)  
 
2007-BRC 
- emphasize 
senior 
management 
commitment;  
-new sections 
(allergens); 
- rigorous grading 
system for 
auditing;  
- auditor 
competence 
requirements 
2011-BRC  
-emphasize on GMP; 
- reduction multiple customer audits; 
- more detailed prescriptive 
requirements; 
- unannounced audit scheme;  
- new auditor training  
2015 BRC 
-audit process consistency;  
-requirement on system to reduce fraud 
exposure;  
-supply chain transparency  & traceability;  
- adoption for small sites;  
- new sections and clauses added; 
- new voluntary modules:  
- trade goods,  
- management animal feed; 
- Global GAP chain of custody;   
- meat supply chain assurance, 
- gluten free products; 
- food safety culture,  
- BRC FSMA 
2018 BRC (version 8) 
Some major changes 
- encouraging development food safety 
culture 
-expanding requirements for 
environmental monitoring 
- section on high risk, high care and 
ambient high care requirements 
- Requirements on traded goods 
-whistleblower system must be integrated 
to ensure all food safety concerns can be 
reported and handled confidentially 
-addition cyber security clause on how to 
handle cyber attacks or failures in internet 
security 
2001-
2005 
2003-IFS 
food 
Introduction other IFS 
standards logistics, global 
markets, food store, etc. 
2008-IFS food 
-focus senior 
management 
2012-IFS food  
- more weight to quality criteria;  
- packaging risks; 
- food defense requirements; 
- integrity program to monitor auditors;  
-additional requirements on validation, 
verification and documentation 
 
2005-
ISO22000 
FSMS 
 2007-ISO22005  
- traceability in 
feed and food chain 
 
2009-ISO22002 
- specific 
prerequisites food 
manufacturing 
2011-ISO22001  
-prerequisites farming 
 
2013-ISO22002  
-prerequisites catering and packaging 
-ISO22003 guidelines for audit and 
certification bodies 
2018-ISO222000  
-structural revision based on revision 
ISO9001:2015; with the high level 
structure, plan-do-check-act; 
-focus on business context and interested 
parties 
-Strengthened emphasis on leadership 
and management commitment 
-Risk management (impact assessment 
positive and negative)  
-Strengthened focus on objectives as 
drivers of improvement 
- Extended requirements on 
communication 
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- Less strict requirements on food safety 
manual 
-management facilitate understanding 
food safety policies by employees 
-establishing FSMS objectives 
- control externally provided processes, 
products or services  
2006-
2010 
2009-
FFSC220
00 
  2012-FFSC 22000  
-adds new scope for food packaging 
manufacturers 
2014-FFSC 22000 
-adds new scope for manufacturing 
animal feed 
2015-FFSC22000  
-adds voluntary model based on ISO9001 
2016-FFSC22000  
-new requirements;  
-unannounced audits;  
- critical nonconformities; 
-standardized audit report;  
- prevention intentional product 
contamination;  
-requirements for transport & storage, 
food services, retail/wholesale 
 1675 
BRC (2015, 2018), https://brc.org.uk/about-brc; FSSC 22000, http://www.fssc22000.com/documents/home; GLOBALG.A.P 1676 
https://www.globalgap.org; ISO 9000 (2015), https://www.iso.org/; ISO (2005, 2018); IFS (2018), https://www.ifs-1677 
certification.com/index.php/en/standards; SQF https://www.sqfi.com/standards).  1678 
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Table 3 – Characterization of context factors that frame the FSMS (Adapted from Luning et al. 2011a; Kirezieva et al. 2013, 2015b) 1679 
Characteristics Examples 
External characteristics 
Legal context Internal framing driven by enforcement philosophy and practices. Sufficiency of food safety authorities 
National culture National values, beliefs, norms related to food safety 
Socio-political context Corruption index, stability, economic situation 
Supply chain context Transparency in the supply chain network, power relations, domestic versus export markets, competitiveness, and interconnectedness. 
Severity and flexibility of stakeholder requirements. Information exchange and degree of asymmetry. Sophistication of logistic infrastructure. 
Degree of globalization of the supply chain and degree of interaction of national cultures and their approach to food safety. 
Internal characteristics 
Business and 
Administrative 
Communication - Vision, mission, policy, strategy on FS-culture and FSMS development - skills, different languages/culture, message 
consistency, along all channels, crucial role middle management. Leadership - moral engagement, enlightenment, reinforcement, employee 
involvement, truly involvement leaders, empower people. Training and learning - Both operator/management training, create FS-culture learning 
environment, respectful feedback, trust, connect information to action, learning from peers, tailored to users/company specific, knowing controls 
and consequences of failures, share experiences with other businesses, use various techniques (story telling, movies). Recruitment and 
employee development - effective interviewing and appointment, setting basic requirements, personal development, incentives/rewards, moral, 
feedback. Use of artefacts and symbols. 
Group (Group, 
department or team) 
Objective characteristics such as multidisciplinary, cross functional collaboration, type and size e.g. HACCP team, shift operators, group roles. 
Subjective or social interactions e.g. communication styles, group behaviour, conflicts, power relations, individual versus group decision 
behaviour and more individuals acting at the group level. Group and social norms e.g. normative standards, attitudes, perceived degree of 
behavioural control. Recognition and acceptance of group member differences in communication styles, in understanding, in culture. 
Engagement - common ownership, all group members being ambassadors of food safety in their work area 
Individual Demographics e.g. age, gender, seniority, education. Psychological e.g. attitude, beliefs, values, norms, habits, personality, personal perception 
of risks, safety, hazards, etc. Knowledge and understanding of food safety/risks, awareness, experience. Psycho-social wellbeing i.e. stress, 
job satisfaction, perceived reward, etc. 
Organizational Level of formalization (formal/informal) structured systems i.e. degree of adoption of manuals, procedures, work instructions. Level of 
information system: record keeping, data collection, archiving and retrieval. Organizational arrangements size & complexity, definition and 
division of tasks, responsibility, rules, authority. Structure i.e. central focus or decentralized, hierarchy, and the interaction of strategic, tactical 
and operational decision-making. Stability of workforce, competence level of workforce, staff turnover. Resource use – primarily financial, 
physical, human capital. Workforce composition and variability 
Product Intrinsic properties of raw materials, in-process material and finished products. Food safety risk associated with the initial materials and 
product (risk associated with allergenic, biological, chemical and physical hazards) 
Production Conditions during production including operational design, technical infrastructure. Food safety risk associated with the production site and 
the physical processes employed. Vulnerabilities and susceptibility to loss of control or contamination.  
Technical Technical resources e.g. facilities, equipment, personnel. Control activities including preventative measures, monitoring and verification 
systems in FSMS. Facility design e.g. hygienic zoning, lay-out, routing. Process design e.g. hygienic design, process capability. Equipment 
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and tools e.g. hygienic design, tailored, availability. Cleaning and disinfection programmes. Maintenance of process and technical equipment. 
Traceability system design and implementation (see Chhikara, Jaglan, Sindhu, Veera, Charan, & Panghal, 2018). 
 1680 
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Table 4. Internal and external triggers that influence FSMS and FCS (Adapted from: Leat & Revoredo-Giha, 2003; Kleboth et al. 2016; 1682 
Manning & Soon, 2016a) 1683 
Internal triggers External triggers 
Wake up call –internal incident/company recall 
New CEO 
Internal policy changes 
New products/product areas 
New brands/existing brands extension 
New technologies 
Audit results 
Changing customer requirements 
Wake up call –incident in sector 
Negative media attention on an issue e.g. foof safety, food fraud 
Regulatory and legislative changes 
Industry or trade association drive new standards or criteria for compliance 
Lobby groups 
Changing consumer demands 
Market and pricing strategies; low operating margins 
Natural disasters, technological accidents, infectious disease (Leat &) 
 1684 
 1685 
  1686 
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Table 5. Hierarchy in decision making within a food organization (adapted from Luning & Marcelis, 2007, 2009; Nyarugwe et al. 2016) 1687 
 1688 
Strategic level 
CEO and executive board 
Tactical level 
Middle management 
Operational level 
Food handlers, operators 
• Content vision mission, etc.; food 
safety focus; 
• Investment in technical & human 
resources; 
• Horizon scanning, risk anticipation; 
systemic risks 
• Investment in food safety research; 
benchmarking, projects 
 
• Design, implementation & 
maintenance FSMS; 
• Dealing with audit & review findings; 
• Data analysis for continuous 
improvement; 
• Dealing with daily safety & hygiene 
issues;  
• Training, instruction, feedback 
operators 
 
• Compliance to safety & hygiene 
procedures 
• Feedback to peers & supervisors 
• Communication observations (near 
misses) etc. 
 
 1689 
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 1693 
Figure 1: Timeline for the adoption of HACCP based approaches to managing food safety (Wallace, 2014)  1694 
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  1695 
Figure 2. The relationship between HACCP, OPRPs and PRPs (adapted from Mortimore & Wallace, 2013)  1696 
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 1697 
 1698 
Figure 3. HACCP as a building block of a food safety management program (Source: Wallace, Sperber & Mortimore, 2011) 1699 
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Figure 4: Drivers and barriers for standard development and adoption, and their impact; model based on Luning & Marcelis (2009) and 1702 
drivers, barriers and impact derived from academic reviews and empirical studies (Latouche & Chevassus-Lozza, 2015; Spadoni, 1703 
Lambardi & Canavari, 2013; Herzfeld, Drescher & Grebitus,  2011; Henson & Humphrey, 2010; Schulze, Albersmeier, Gawron, Spiller & 1704 
Theuvsen, 2008; Theuvsen & Spiller, 2007; Fulponi, 2006; Henson & Reardon, 2005)   1705 
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